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ABSTRACT
This study considers the effects of consuming late-night political humor on audience
members’ individual-level affective political polarization. Existing literature suggests that many
late-night comedy television programs already influence viewers’ political engagement,
including voting likelihood and political talk likelihood. Programming like The Daily Show
(TDS) employs satiric critique within broader parodic framework to engage audience members’
political identities. These identities are incredibly emotional and, combined with comedic
capacity to provoke anger, exert significant influence over individual behavioral tendencies.
Subsequently, it makes sense to consider the affectively polarizing capacity of these shows—
measured both by favorability, or ingroup confidence, and social distance, or hostility towards
members of opposing political parties. This study implements experimental research design to
test this theory, finding a mildly significant relationship between consumption of TDS and
individual-level affective polarization that is heavily mitigated by a variety of other independent
variables.
Keywords: late-night comedy, polarization, political humor, Trevor Noah, Donald Trump.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Political polarization is the current most pressing threat to American democracy. It shortcircuits government, drains our economy, and kills public faith in key national institutions.
Moreover, it directly affects our social-emotional behavior; some research even suggests that
political polarization within families drastically impacts social interaction at holiday meals
(Jilani 2018). Left unchecked, this political disease will bring our country to a standstill.
Coincidentally—or maybe uncoincidentally—the pronounced rise of American
polarization parallels rapid evolution of national media consumption habits. This transformation
is epitomized in the breakneck re-centering of political news content in entertainment media; an
ever-growing number of young voters now turn to shows like Last Week Tonight and The Daily
Show (TDS) for their political news rather than programming like CNN or NBC. Over a third of
American youth now report consuming late-night political comedy television at least once a
week; at the same time, political polarization has reached record highs (Baumgartner and Becker
2018).
This study attempts to consider these phenomena collectively, quantitatively defining the
relationship between late-night political comedy consumption and viewers’ individual levels of
affective political polarization. In the following chapter, I first briefly explain the foundational
motivation for this project. I then justify my research, and delineate key terminology. I conclude
with a summary outline of my experimental methodological design.
Purpose
Late-night political comedy television programs like TDS are often classified as
‘infotainment’ or ‘soft news’ and, consequently, are excluded from discussion of news programs’
political rhetoric and impact. This study is intended to challenge that categorization by assessing
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these programs’ structural formatting and testing for a direct relationship between content
exposure and audience members’ individual-level affective polarization. This project will
quantitatively analyze data collected via a survey experiment to measure the impact of TDS, one
of the most popular American late-night political comedy television programs, on viewers’
affective political polarization (Baumgartner and Becker 2018).
Rationales
Despite years of research concerning both late-night comedy television and political
polarization, little has been done to define or test for any relationship between the two. Any
attention given thus far to entertainment-based political media—or ‘soft news’—exclusively
emphasizes late-night comedy programming’s impact on consumers’ political engagement.
Though we consequently have an increased understanding of what this exposure means for
audience members’ political knowledge, interest, and talk, we know very little about how it may
affect their individual-level affective polarization (Baek and Wojcieszak 2009; Landreville et al.
2011; Lee 2011; Moy et al. 2005). Moreover, political polarization is too often treated
exclusively at an ideological or elite level—sometimes with focus on gerrymandered
redistricting or similar political maneuvers—to the neglect of social-emotional considerations.
This study fills that gap in knowledge by testing for a potential relationship between political
comedy and affective political polarization.
Uncovering a link between consuming late-night comedy television and affective
polarization is not the only motivator for this study. Traditional research concerning late-night
comedy shows often also fails to consider different genres of comedy; satire and parody are
decidedly different approaches to humor, and there must be a clear distinction made before any
analysis can occur (Compton 2010; Hariman 2008). Studies concerning Saturday Night Live, for
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instance, should not be treated or understood the same way as studies focusing on TDS (Warner
2007). This project will both further clarify that distinction and focus on political satire—in the
experimental design—to generate new and more accurate data.
Finally, an ever-increasing number of young voters are turning to late-night shows for
political news, and it is important that we understand what this shift means for our broader
American democracy (Baumgartner and Becker 2018). Pronounced polarization is essentially
tribalism; we significantly disrupt and alter our national political culture when we isolate
ourselves in like-minded groups. Legislative gridlock damages governmental function, costs us
billions of dollars annually, and reduces public confidence in our institutions. Worse, the
antagonistic restructuring of our political culture severely abbreviates and reforms our individual
social lives. One recent study found that Thanksgiving dinners are significantly shorter in regions
where Americans share family across party lines; researchers estimate that polarization
eliminated 34 million hours of cross-partisan discourse in 2016 alone (Jilani 2018). Increased
affective polarization will bring our nation to a standstill if left unchecked; this study serves as a
foundation for future conflict resolution.
Definitions
Not all late-night comedy is created equal. TDS and similar programs primarily couch
satiric humor, or “the use of humor, irony, exaggeration, or ridicule to expose and criticize,” in a
parodic framework (Higgie 2017, p. 36). Parodic structure, defined as “the comic refunctioning
of preformed linguistic or artistic material,” duplicates and mimics existing entities—in this case
mainstream political news sources—to subtly undermine and jam popular culture (Hariman
2008, p. 250).
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Affective polarization is a uniquely delineated element of broader political polarization. It
refers to reinforced ingroup identity and outgroup hostility, both behavioral tendencies highly
motivated by emotion. Consequently, affective polarization is operationalized in this study as
especially reliant on anger and is generally defined both through favorability toward presented
political content and through social distance from members of opposing political parties.
Method
I created a survey experiment to test for a potential relationship between exposure to latenight comedy and viewers’ levels of political polarization. Representatively sampling American
citizens via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) platform, I randomly assigned two treatments.
One group viewed a segment from TDS concerning President Trump’s border wall construction,
while the other read an exact transcript of the same clip manipulatively attributed to CNN’s
Anderson Cooper. Both factions then completed the same survey, designed to measure the effect
of each respective treatment on individual-level affective polarization. Participants were
compensated. Finally, I scaled and recorded survey question responses to reliably compare these
two distinct data sets.
Conclusion
Millions of Americans—myself included—regularly consume late-night political comedy
television without once thinking about its possible influence over political behavior or thought
processes. This is potentially catastrophic for our national democracy. The following study
addresses that probability and quantitatively establishes a relationship between consumption of
such programming and individual-level affective political polarization.
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
Relatively early in his polemical career, English poet and civil servant John Milton
declared laughter and anger “the two most rational faculties of humane intellect” (Samuel 1972,
p. 1). This connection serves as the grounding theoretical structure behind this study and,
accordingly, is the primary consideration of this chapter. Comedic capacity to elicit anger
suggests the genre is elementally imbued with the power to alter audience behavior; this
emotional movement—alternately described as ‘affect’—is a distinct component of broader
affective polarization. Such is the purpose of this study: to measure any relationship between
consuming political comedic television content and individual-level audience members’ affective
polarization.
Humor is a pervasive and integral part of our daily life. It has become a part of many of
our daily routines—we consume it in stand-up specials, the music we listen to, and the television
shows we watch. Despite this almost quotidian prominence and relevance, however, the type of
comedy we enjoy has varied wildly across the years. Recently, we have witnessed an exponential
rise in the percentage of young American voters turning to late-night political comedy television
as either their primary source of news or as a complement to mainstream news consumption.
Moreover, researchers Moy et al. note measurable decline in traditional news outlet
viewership—nightly network news, daily newspapers, and local television news outlets all report
roughly ten percent drops in audience numbers even as late-night comedy viewership rises
(2005). This paradigm shift has yet to be adequately addressed in either communication studies
or political science literature.
Though myriad scholars have begun assessing the consequences of this new comedic era,
the studies that do exist almost exclusively measure the effect of political humor on audience
5

engagement (e.g., Baek and Wojcieszak 2009). Such literature, consequently, often neglects the
relationship between political identity and emotional or affective polarization. This study fills
that gap in knowledge by explaining how the emotional interrelatedness of political identity and
satirical comedy exacerbates viewers’ individual-level affective polarization. Here, late-night
political comedy is epitomized in and measured with The Daily Show (TDS), and affective
polarization is operationalized both in measurements of favorability and pronounced social
distance.
In the following chapter, I synthesize and critique existing literature pertinent to my
topic. This encompasses a range of specific concepts and theories, each of which is addressed in
these next pages. First, I examine the emotional qualities inherent in political identity. Next, I
provide a comprehensive rhetorical critique of comedy itself, especially considering its
subversive political machinations. I then examine late-night political comedy television
programming and its immediate political effects on audience behavior before clearly
conceptualizing affective polarization. Finally, I explicitly delineate and construct the new
theoretical framework that guides this project.
Political Identity
Political identity is deeply emotional. This is not itself a groundbreaking revelation—
political ideology and partisanship are emotionally gladiatorial even on social media—but this
fact is epistemologically critical to my study.
Social identity theory posits that an individual’s sense of collective identity arises from
group membership, often creating an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ mentality that is conceptually identical
to political partisanship and party affiliation. Henri Tajfel’s 1979 realization that the groups to
which people belong are an important source of pride and self-esteem is crucial to this study—
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the ingroups to which we belong employ emotion politically, regulating when and how we share
our feelings such that we maintain and facilitate proper social group function (Huddy et al. 2015;
Shields 2005). Essentially, those groups upon which we predicate our self-identity use emotion
as a political tool to preserve and promote said identity; often, differentiation from the norms of
disliked outgroups elicits peer approval and self-pride, while conformity to outgroup norms
results in disapproval or shame (Suhay 2015). Consider, for instance, the immediate and explicit
conflict often found in cross-partisan families—disconformity to familial political ingroup values
often provokes terse disapproval or dislike. Political identity and emotional expressivity are so
closely interrelated, in fact, that research suggests the average person can adequately predict
another individual’s partisanship using only information visually extracted from the face
(Peterson et al. 2018).
This political-emotional relationship underscores the relevance and prominence of
affective polarization, as I discuss later in the chapter. Ideological differentiation and elite-level
disagreement are also, notably, often subordinate to affective behavior.
Comedic Rhetoric
Comedy is a communicative and markedly dialogic process. Such foundational
understanding of the genre is important to this study; it is virtually impossible to truly employ
fully nonnormative, quantitative research methods without this informational literature synthesis.
Humor is primal. It persists throughout millennia and exists innately from birth (Ziv and
Labelle 1984). Though early forms of comedy were limited and slapstick, entertainment quickly
evolved to encompass a range of techniques and strategies. The following section considers the
two most prominent genres of humor in contemporary society: parody and satire. Both are of
vital importance to this study. Though late-night political comedy television routinely employs
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satiric advocacy content, it is regularly framed in a parodic format mimicking the presentation of
mainstream or ‘hard’ news media.
Forms of Comedy: Parody and Satire
Generally, it is understood that there are two hegemonic forms or genres of comedy—
parody and satire (Compton 2010; Hariman 2008; Warner 2007). Though these genres initially
seem to share many characteristics, they differ both in foundational purpose and structure; the
two are employed differently to accomplish distinctly different ends.
The word ‘parody’ itself translates directly to “beside the song” (Hariman 2008).
Fittingly, the form is predicated on exaggerated mimicry; parody is the act of taking an item or
situation and reproducing it humorously through duplicity or embellishment (Hariman 2008).
This remediation or reproduction refracts society back on itself, extracting elements we find
confusing or funny and magnifying them (Hariman 2008). It is a process that strips targets of
individuality, turning their actions into cartoonish caricature and consequently removing the
gravitas of original performance. It also reveals fundamental truths about individuals or events
previously couched in behavioral mannerism and verbose rhetoric—essentially, parody is
elementally concerned with the destabilization of hegemonic norms (in keeping with the
subversive nature of comedic entertainment). Parody occurs frequently even in daily social
interaction, but The Colbert Report is arguably the pinnacle of this comedic form, in which latenight comedy host Stephen Colbert adopts the persona of a radical, far-right conservative
intellectual. When considering the Iraq War in one segment, for instance, Colbert tells his
audience that “doubts can happen to everyone, including me, but as a responsible journalist, I’ve
taken my doubts, fears, moral compass, conscience, and all-pervading skepticism about the very
nature of this war and simply placed them in this empty Altoids box” (Warner 2007, p. 24).
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Mocking his targets—conservative journalists—by exaggerating confusing or hypocritical
features of their public appearance, Colbert employs parodic humor to reveal the absurdity of the
situation. Here, as is often the case with parody, the comedic reproduction of a real message or
action demonstrates the simple fundamental truth that “public media and democratic politics
alike are delusional, hopelessly self-absorbed, [and] pathetically conventional” (Hariman 2008,
p. 272).
Satiric humor, our second comedic form, is decidedly more complex. This form employs
irony, exaggeration, or ridicule to expose and critique stupidity or vice, and is often politically
oriented. There are two key types of satire: Horatian and Juvenalian. Horatian satire is often selfdirected, emphasizing playfulness and laughter. Because lighthearted self-critique ameliorates
reputation (or approval ratings), this comedic subgenre is commonly employed by those
attempting to seem warm or engaging (Warner 2007). Even definitionally, self-directed humor
offers the user an opportunity to “ridicule [their] own behavior in a light-hearted and engaging
way,” connecting with the audience on a personal level. Psychological research concerning
Horatian humor suggests it is often seen as “genuinely funny” because it promotes solidarity,
encourages viewers to take matters less seriously, and humanizes authority figures (Becker and
Haller 2014, p. 43). Consequently, politicians often use Horatian satire to maximize their
likeability among viewers different from the traditional mainstream news audience. Al Gore, for
instance, harnessed these shows’ power in the 2000 presidential elections to boost his approval
ratings and popular support (Young 2006). Antithetical to its counterpart, Juvenalian humor is
other-directed and emphasizes aggression and judgment in scathing critique of everyday life
(Becker and Haller 2014). This is the chosen comedic subgenre of most late-night political
comedy television hosts because of its short-term capacity to provoke agreement among
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viewers—in line, in certain regards, with functional social identity theory (2014). Additionally,
Juvenalian humor is virtually always employed to create mental or behavioral change, as ironic
or comedic criticism serves almost exclusively to identify and correct existing problems
(Hariman 2008; Hart 2013; Lee 2011).
Understanding these comedic forms’ tandem capacity to influence an audience
emotionally and behaviorally is a critical component of this study. Though the overarching
parodic framework of late-night comedy television is important to appropriately contextualize its
programming, it is the satiric content that most directly affects an audience. Political satire is
shown to elicit distinct feelings of anger, which can have repercussions for political engagement
and behavior (Chen et al. 2017; Hoon and Kwak 2014; Samual 1972). Anger produces both a
sense of entitlement and a sense that a perpetrator has intentionally harmed or threatened that
which we care about, generating a self-righteous certainty and sense of control along with
confidence in one’s ingroup and its ability to fight back (Aristotle 1954; Brader 2012; Shields
2005; Stevens 2002). This emotional reaction to satiric humor is explicitly considered further in
this chapter’s concluding section, but is important to recognize as we proceed with this study.
Furthermore, satire and parody are different from “traditional punchline-oriented late-night
comedy” in format, common content, and political consequences (Hoffman and Young 2011, p.
163). Significant differences exist, that is, between satiric and parodic programs like TDS or Last
Week Tonight and stand-up comedy specials such as John Mulaney’s The Comeback Kid or
Kevin Hart’s Irresponsible. We cannot—and should not—lump all late-night comedy
programming together as ‘soft news’ or ‘infotainment.’
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Subversive Comedic Intent
All comedy, regardless of genre or context, is created with subversive intent (Hariman
2008; Warner 2007; Young 2006). Parodic humor, as discussed, instrumentally reveals
situational truth through duplicitous embellishment or neutralization of gravitas. Satire,
concordantly, exposes societal flaws through either self-deprecating or biting critique. The
subversive intent of both comedic genres is evident; though not limited to any specific usage,
both satire and parody lend themselves strongly to political employment.
Indeed, political humor is demonstrably subversive. Television programs like TDS exist
to disrupt and expose mainstream political media, alternatively interpreting events and
individuals to ‘jam’ the hegemonic message (Warner 2007). These shows succeed by using
“emotional and aesthetic modalities similar to those employed by political branding itself,”
essentially creating parodic messaging to reveal the limitations and shortcomings of the hard
news to which we are constantly exposed (Warner 2007, p. 19). Consider, for instance, the work
of media activist Kalle Lasn. Lasn’s digital project (www.adbusters.org) routinely runs multiple
“subvertisement” campaigns employing alternative imagery within traditional branding
technology format and design layout. “A well-produced print ‘subvertisement,’” Lasn writes,
“Mimics the look and feel of the target ad, prompting the classic double-take as viewers realize
what they’re seeing is the very opposite of what they expected” (Lasn, 2000, p. 131).
Subversive messaging is appealing because it is couched in cynical realism, encouraging
audience members to feel self-righteous anger and self-gratifying satisfaction that they are too
clever to blindly follow societal hegemony. Late-night television hosts use Oz-like political
models to “throw back the curtain on serial deceptions,” using their platform to present a world
where unseen forces attempt to manipulate and deceive us daily (Hart 2013, p. 347; Hmielowski
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2011). TDS, especially, epitomizes this model. In one memorable installment, ex-host Jon
Stewart suggests that we must “give up the pipe dream once and for all that an inspirational
leader can challenge the status quo.” Rather, we are “number one in aspiring political leaders
telling us how great we are,” so we should have monthly political conventions in every state and
inject billions into the “balloon-drop, straw-hat, and dead escort-removal industries” (as qtd. in
Hart 2013, p. 349). Such rhetoric is designed to elicit audience members’ self-gratifying
confidence in their own cleverness, while its emphasis on political rhetoric and strategy lowers
our general trust in government (Hart 2013). Stewart frequently invokes such political motive to
remind audiences that politicians are often underhanded or self-serving.
Established literature concerning humor also identifies four common dimensions of an
individual’s affinity for humor (Becker and Haller 2014; Hmielowski 2011; Ziv and Labelle
1984). The first emphasizes the importance of incongruent information—certain individuals
default to comedic response, often in the face of either the unexpected or socially contradictory.
This dimension contains two key sub-concepts: understanding of societal norms, and an
understanding of what is ‘actually’ funny. An individual must comprehend cultural and societal
expectations in order to recognize inconsistencies, but simultaneously will only identify middling
incongruency as funny. That is, individuals generally do not ascribe comedic value to
inconsistencies that stray too far in either direction (Hmielowski 2011).
The second dimension is superiority. This dimension is most applicable to Juvenalian
satire, as it deals with the aggressive or hostile function of humor; audiences often ascribe greater
comedic value to those jokes or events that supply them with feelings of superiority. As an
established approach to identifying unacceptable behavior, other-directed humor is often used to
mask perceived insecurities or inadequacy (Ziv and Labelle 1984). Consequently, political
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comedians and satirists routinely joke at the expense of certain individuals and party
establishments, for “laughing at the mistakes of others allows individuals to feel more secure
with their own beliefs and removes insecurities they may have about their own behaviors or
preferred political group” (Hmielowski 2011, p. 99). This dimension is interrelated with social
identity theory, as previously contextualized by political identity.
The third common dimension of affinity for humor is grounded in socially awkward
situations. In such environments, comedy is used to alleviate tension, almost as a defense
mechanism (Hmielowski 2011; Ziv and Labelle 1984). This dimension reminds us that humor
can be instrumental in reducing anxiety; in a political context, it elicits assuredness and
comfortability in our own political ideology.
The final dimension demonstrates humor’s social capacity. We use comedy to connect
with each other; research shows that individuals often seek out others they find funny
(Hmielowski 2011). Social bonds are formed in dialogic agreement over what is subjectively
funny, and often other-directed humor targeting elite individuals or groups is a powerful uniter.
The classic inside joke, as well, can strengthen relationships between certain individuals
(Hmielowski 2011; Ziv and Labelle 1984).
Mediated Political Comedy
Having attained an understanding of comedic form and its subversive nature, we must
now consider the distinct preferred content presented to us in late-night comedy television:
political humor. Though most existing literature concerning the immediate consequences of
political comedy begins with an initial appraisal of audience demographics—such as prior
political knowledge, pre-existing interest, and audience ideology—this section will begin with a
preliminary discussion of format. Structurally, parodic programming influences audience
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understanding of satiric content, promoting emotionality, which serves as the connection
between political humor and consequent affective behavioral tendencies. It is only after this
examination of format that audience demographics will be identified, after which I will consider
the immediate consequences of consuming late-night comedy, including increases in political
discussion, knowledge, and guest popularity.
Format
As previously discussed, the parodic structure of late-night political comedy television is
intended to ‘culture jam,’ or subvert hegemonic messaging from mainstream news media
(Warner 2007). Programs like TDS only make sense within this format, as a twisted mimicry of
traditional, hardline news. Consequently, these shows are structurally similar to those one might
find on a large, traditional network. Warner notes, for instance, that “watching the show with the
volume turned down might not alert you to the fact that this is anything other than one of the
myriad news options now available” (2007, p. 24). This overarching parodic framework
comedically contextualizes the content, enclosing any Juvenalian satiric content in lighthearted
atmosphere.
This parodic structure does give way to important deviation, however. Though late-night
comedy television programs share elemental and indispensable structure with traditional
programming—‘straight’ delivery of news, often via monologue, followed by panel discussion
or guest interview—hosts operate on a more conversational or dialogic model of communication.
The hybrid political interview model, a broadcast news format in which the journalist is
positioned not just as investigator but as socio-political advocate, offers audience members an
“escape from the reality of a hyper-partisan political climate and the reliance on mainstream
news outlets that are increasingly deemed untrustworthy” (Becker and Goldberg 2017, p. 132).
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Audience Demographics
It may come as no surprise that late-night comedy television programming often caters to
an overwhelmingly young audience (Young 2006). This demographic affinity for such content is
partially motivated by the negative correlation between age and political knowledge, and it
bolstered by ingrained media consumption habits (older citizens are exponentially more likely to
consume those mainstream news outlets they grew up with).
Late-night political comedy television audiences are also often well-educated, though
some research suggests a large percentage of viewers tune in for pure entertainment value (Baek
and Wojcieszak 2009; LaMarre and Walthers 2015; Moy et al. 2005). This educational
background and pre-existing political knowledge are important when considering the polarizing
consequences of political comedy consumption.
Finally, liberal or Democratic partisans are far more likely to watch TDS and similar
programming (“Section 4”). This is primarily because these shows often feature liberal hosts and
tend to critique or ridicule conservative political figures and policies.
Consumption Consequences
Exposure to late-night comedy television programming significantly influences audience
members’ political engagement. This influence manifests in myriad tangible behavioral
consequences including increased discussion of politics with likeminded conversational partners,
increased general political knowledge, the creation of affective positive negativity—upbeat
conceptualization of downbeat news or content—and favorable perceptions of guest candidates.
In the following paragraphs, I account for each of these political behavioral corollaries.
Those who regularly consume late-night political humor do engage in political talk with
more individuals more often, but they also show a heightened tendency to talk with people who
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share their political ideology (Landreville and LaMarre 2011; Lee 2012; Moy et al. 2005).
Summarily, these viewers often fail to engage with members of their respective opposing
political parties, preferring instead to interact with those who hold the same partisan views.
Scholar Hoon Lee demonstrated this behavior in one notable study that utilized existing mail
surveys and conducted a separate experiment (2012). Lee gathered experimental data from a
2011 online experiment originally conducted by the research firm Qualtrics. Of the 2,301 adult
panelists invited, 861 agreed to participate, and 758 successfully completed the experiment.
These participants were chosen randomly and represented a range of sexes, median household
incomes, education levels, ethnicities, and partisan identities. After giving consent, individuals
were randomly assigned to one of three treatments: one group watched a short clip from TDS
including several segments on a recent government bailout of big companies, while the second
viewed a compilation of NBC’s Nightly News clips on the same subject. Both videos presented
the same basic content—the Treasury Secretary’s appearance at a Congressional hearing—and
were the same length. The third group, a control group, watched a neutral segment covering a
new Disney Resort in Orlando. After the experiment, every participant completed a questionnaire
measuring their “emotions, attitudes, and behavioral intentions” regarding the economy. With
each response coded on a scale, the findings were conclusive: consuming late-night comedy has
little effect on viewers’ willingness to discuss politics with non-likeminded others (Lee 2012, p.
656).
Literature also suggests that late-night comedy television programs increase viewers’
general political knowledge (Baek and Wojcieszak 2009). However, the same research indicates
that exposure to late-night comedy television is only associated with “increases in relatively easy
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political knowledge” and has virtually no influence on consumers’ political knowledge about
more complex or difficult issues (Baek and Wojcieszak 2009, p. 795).
Often, political comedy teaches audiences valuable critical reasoning skills through
creation of an emotional or affective response. Late-night political comedy programming shares
the same subversive intent with its genre counterparts; consequently, many program hosts strive
to highlight the gap between idealism and realism (Lee 2012; Pfau 2007). Consider, for instance,
Trevor Noah’s evisceration of President Trump’s border wall construction; juxtaposing the
President’s early comments about impenetrability with recent reports of breaches emphasizes the
disparity. This ‘positive negativity,’ as it is often called, teaches audiences critical reasoning
skills essential to participatory democracy by creating a distinctly affective response—harsh
Juvenalian criticism elicits anger from an audience, affecting behavioral tendencies one way,
while light-hearted Horatian presentation increases “viewers’ sense of self-efficacy” (Lee 2011,
p. 7).
Programs like TDS also routinely invite candidates to the show for guest appearances.
This can have direct and immediate consequences on audience members’ perceptions of these
public figures; candidates who acknowledge and cooperate with parodic imitation (like that of
Saturday Night Live, Between Two Ferns, or TDS) often enjoy a substantial boost in ratings
(Young 2006). Presidential willingness to engage with Saturday Night Live (SNL)
impersonations, especially, have profound positive effects on individuals’ popularity. Presidents
Gerald Ford, George H.W. Bush, William Clinton, and Barack Obama all enjoyed higher
approval ratings after cooperating with their SNL comedic counterparts (Compton 2010; Higgie
2017). The persuasive power of late-night comedy television over an audience is again evident
here and is something to be mindful of as we progress with this study.
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While four measurable consequences of viewing late-night comedy television exist—
increased political discussions with likeminded conversational partners, heightened general
knowledge of politics, creation of positive negativity, and positive perceptions of political figures
who cooperate—these consequences are often mediated by viewers’ preexisting value systems,
including both partisan ideology and political interest/prior knowledge (Arpan et al. 2009;
Becker and Haller 2014; LaMarre and Walthers 2015). That is, the effects of consuming latenight comedy are strengthened or weakened by audience members’ personal identities.
The first mediator is straightforward; political comedy television programming is broadly
perceived as liberally biased (Arpan et al. 2009). Controlling for viewer partisanship, researchers
are still uncovering nuances in this media bias phenomenon. For instance, Republican consumers
are less likely to embrace mediated messaging from any outlet, but they also perceive less bias in
Fox News’ coverage of conservative politicians than in that of late-night comedy television
programming (Arpan et al. 2009). Essentially, viewer partisanship plays an enormous role in
mediating the political effects of exposure to late-night political humor (Xenos et al. 2009;
LaMarre and Walthers 2015). Moreover, consumers are “more likely to appreciate comedy that
targets an individual or group toward which they feel a negative affect” (Becker and Haller 2014,
p. 36). This research extends social identity theory to late-night comedy television programming,
once again confirming the power of ingroup and outgroup norms.
Political interest and prior knowledge also critically mediate the effects of late-night
comedy consumption. Communication studies scholars and political scientists often divide these
audiences into two distinct groups: those with political interest and prior knowledge, and the
inattentive public (Baek and Wojcieszak 2009; LaMarre and Walthers 2015; Moy et al. 2005).
The term ‘inattentive public’ refers to those who tune in purely out of curiosity or for
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entertainment value but lack a particularly strong prior interest in the content or broader political
context. Political humor influences the inattentive public much more strongly than it does the
informed public; Heather LaMarre and Whitney Walthers found in one 2013 study that
inattentive voters who consume soft news—like late-night comedy programs—are not only more
likely to vote, but to display higher levels of political interest after watching. This relationship is
partially facilitated by both individual smug satisfaction at ‘getting’ a joke, which generates
positive affect that increases desire to further engage, and the Dunning Kruger Effect (a
cognitive bias in which people assess their cognitive ability as greater than it is).
Affective Polarization
Partisan gridlock is a real phenomenon. Too often, however, academic consideration of
polarization exists at an ideological or elite level and neglects consideration of the affective or
social-emotional aspects of such behavior. This is a distinct mistake, especially considering
recent polarizing behavioral tendencies among the American public. One 2014 Pew Research
Center survey epitomized this trend, finding that 15 percent of Democratic and 17 percent of
Republican respondents were unhappy with the idea of an immediate family member marrying
someone of the opposing party. This mutual dislike is much higher than it ever has been before
and extends even into quotidian life—we socially distance ourselves from opposing partisans
through spending habits, romantic decisions, and even official organizational membership
(Iyengar et al. 2012). In the following paragraphs, I will both define affective polarization and
briefly review contemporary motivation for such behavioral trends.
Though pronounced affective polarization is a distinctly recent American political
phenomenon—despite flurries of historically similar national behavior—it is not in and of itself a
new concept. Campbell et. al originally connected political identity with emotional behavior in
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1960, noting that while ideological membership strongly influences partisan choice, affect has an
equal (if not stronger) effect on partisan bonding. Moreover, those who strongly identify with a
distinct political party are highly unlikely to break that partisan bond even if the party’s ideology
changes, further suggesting emotional affect plays a crucial role in broader polarization.
Coalescence of political identity with social identity has increased dramatically in just the past
few decades, creating an aggressively hostile electorate fragmented into radicalized parties
despite broadly common individual ideological positioning (Iyengar et al. 2012; Mason 2013;
Mason 2014).
The American press corps epitomizes the wholesale affective polarization currently
plaguing our nation. Partisan media outlets have expanded rapidly in recent years and now
dominate the American cable news market. These programs’ rise in popularity parallels
intensifying national political polarization, causing scholars to examine public attachment to
partisan media. These researchers have and do repeatedly emphasize the increasingly diverse and
partisan media environment as a causal mechanism (Levendusky 2013). Consumers now have
unprecedented choice in the media they consume—selective exposure is a well-documented
phenomenon at this point—and consequently emphasis is placed on the effects of this
personalized consumption on political polarization (Iyenger et al. 2012; Levedusky 2013).
Partisan media are consumed most frequently by likeminded viewers on either end of the
political spectrum; scholar Levendusky found that viewing like-minded media reinforces
attitudes and radicalizes audiences, with effects lasting several days (2013). This confirmation
directly facilitates affective polarization since the ability to engage selectively with like-minded
media allows consumers to self-validate, often at the expense of disliked political figures or
partisans.
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Moreover, exposure to messaging that contradicts or directly attacks one’s worldview
often pushes consumers to retreat into their existing beliefs and values. This phenomenon,
colloquially dubbed the ‘backfire effect,’ is influential in research challenging personal opinions
(Nyhan and Reifer 2010). Still, the consequences of consuming opposite-minded or crosscutting
media are not as pronounced as the consequences of consuming likeminded media. This is
primarily because exposure to crosscutting media causes viewers to disregard both presented
information and the source itself, whereas exposure to likeminded media bolsters audineces’
confidence in their political values and beliefs (Levendusky 2013).
Political polarization is powered by systemic issues like gerrymandered redistricting and
by contributing factors like elite conflict and ideological difference, but is in essence an affective
phenomenon. This understanding is important both to my study holistically and to the creation of
a distinctly new theoretical framework.
Theoretical Construction
Holistic consideration of political identity (and social identity theory), comedic rhetoric,
and late-night political comedy television allows us to construct a working theory through which
we may proceed. It follows such: emotional identities, if critiqued or attacked, produce affective
response. Moreover, critiques couched in satire specifically produce anger as audiences perceive
harm, losses, and threats or uncertainty about the outcome of a specific situation (Bredvold 1940;
Sienkiewicz 2018). This perception consequently encourages us to adjust our behavior
defensively such that we reduce uncertainty and increase personal control, often retreating to an
ingroup’s norms and expectations at the expense of an outgroup (Aristotle 1954; Brader 2012,
Landreville and LaMarre 2011; Stephens 2013). Hostile or Juvenalian satire especially, in which
other-directed targets are humiliated and/or insulted, promotes aggression. Researchers
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Weinstein, Hodgins, and Ostvik-White tell us clearly that “enjoying others’ misfortune is an
indirect and acceptable way for socialized individuals to express aggression without incurring the
self or social censure associated with direct aggression….Although hostile humor is socially
acceptable, it nonetheless is aggressive behavior” (2011, p. 1048). Certain specific joke
structures, as well, directly provoke decidedly negative emotion (Chan 2014). Concordantly,
voters who identify strongly with a distinct political party experience anger more readily
(Groenendyk and Banks 2014).
I propose a positive, direct relationship between exposure to late-night political humor
and individual-level consumer affective polarization. Political identity’s elemental emotional
quality interrelates directly with affective behavior, especially when coupled with Juvenalian
satiric capacity to elicit further anger, and so relevant programming should have strong political
consequences for its audiences. My distinct proposition is that these consequences amalgamate
in affective political polarization; the anger generated by parodic ‘culture jamming’ messages
reinforces affective behavioral tendencies and facilitates affective polarization.
Affective polarization should be observed regardless of participants’ individual
partisanship, even as strong partisans are expected to experience the phenomenon more strongly.
Though late-night political comedy television overwhelmingly caters to liberal viewers through
other-directed jokes targeting conservative politicians and policies, this political partiality will
serve to entrench and radicalize Democratic audience members further in their own ideology.
Concordantly, conservative response to crosscutting threatened values will force consumers back
into their own ingroup, consequently lowering the demographic’s willingness to engage in
dialogic communication outside their party. Essentially, both parties’ members should
experience observably increased levels of affective polarization.
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Alloying the deeply rooted emotionality of political identity with the satirical capacity to
provoke anger affords us unique insight into the enormous influence late-night political comedy
television exerts over its audiences’ behavioral tendencies. This emotional quality—or affect—is
a crucial component of affective polarization; late-night political comedy consisting primarily of
other-directed political satire designed to provoke anger either confirms and validates likeminded viewers or forces tangible behavioral response taken to neutralize the threat. Affective
polarization, defined by mutual dislike and social distance, is an evident product of this process.
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY
This study considers the effect of consuming late-night political satiric content on
audiences’ affective polarization. The primary independent variable is varied content delivery (or
treatment), operationalized here as either exposure to a TDS clip or a verbatim written transcript
manipulatively attributed to CNN’s Anderson Cooper. The dependent variable is individual-level
affective polarization, or polarization embedded in favorability and social distance measurement
rather than purely ideological disagreement. There are no true moderating or confounding
variables in this study; literature suggests that a relationship should be observed regardless of
audience orientation or demographic.
Informed by existing research relevant to my study, my hypothesis predicted a positive
linear relationship between exposure to late-night political comedy and individual-level audience
affective polarization. This hypothesis and its corresponding null hypothesis are as follows:
H1: Consumption of late-night political comedy television, such as TDS, heightens or
exacerbates audiences’ individual-level affective political polarization.
H0: There is absolutely no relationship between consumption of late-night political
comedy television, such as TDS, and audiences’ individual-level affective political
polarization.
Experimental Design
To test this hypothesis, I employed an experimental survey design. Experimental
methodology allows for high internal validity—meaning cause and effect can be better
isolated—as well as minute, systematic control of conditions and variables, allowing researchers
to better tailor structural design to specific research. Experimental designs are also repeatable,
which ensures results can be retried under a myriad of external conditions to validate and verify
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findings. These three advantages benefitted my project, and allowed me to draw concrete causal
conclusions about my hypothetical relationship.
Each methodological approach does, of course, have certain disadvantages as well.
Experimental designs are often low in external validity, meaning results cannot always be
generalized to a broader population. I used Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) users to address
this challenge—though not perfect, as I explain momentarily, MTurk often helps alleviate
external validity issues by providing access to a representatively large and diverse user base.
This platform also resolved a second flaw with my experimental methodology: lack of control
over external variables. Online surveys, such as the one conducted here, do not account for
setting, mood, or any number of other factors that can potentially influence participant response.
The scale of my sample diminished these concerns. Employing a real TDS clip additionally
enhanced external validity, accurately reflecting real mediated content in a way that a mock
video would not. Finally, the artificial nature of many experimental designs often interferes with
results; consumption of TDS in my experimental design was markedly different than regular,
normal exposure to the show.
Primary Independent Variable
To successfully operationalize my independent variable, I exposed participants in my
study to a specific late-night comedy television program. I chose to incorporate clips from TDS
for two specific reasons: first, no research has focused on the show since Trevor Noah’s debut as
host, and second, the show’s comedic form is typical of the genre (employing pronounced
Juvenalian satiric humor couched in a broader parodic structure).
Participants randomly assigned the treatment viewed a three-minute TDS clip
comedically critiquing construction of a Southern border wall. Though I originally intended to
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include both this clip and a similar clip discussing the same issue from a conservative
perspective, I ultimately decided this would not be reflective of the current late-night political
comedy landscape, which trends overwhelmingly liberal (Moy et al. 2005; Warner 2007). In the
chosen segment, Trevor Noah juxtaposes Trump’s original claims about border wall
impenetrability with recent reports of smugglers routinely breaching construction, emphasizing
comically disparate expectations with reality (selected still images from this clip are shown
below in Table 3.3). This brief clip is linked here, with a full transcript available in the attached
Appendix.
Table 3.3—TDS Treatment Images

I also included a treatment designed to measure the relationship between more objective
news consumption and individual-level audience political polarization. This treatment
manifested as a verbatim transcript of the TDS clip, and provided comparative value to measure
any existing relationship between general news consumption and affective polarization. This
narrative appears below and is also included in the Appendix.
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Table 3.4—Narrative (attributed to CNN’s Anderson Cooper)
ANDERSON COOPER: But it seemed like this was a wall-themed weekend for Donald Trump,
because on Friday, at a rally in Mississippi, the president was boasting once again about just how
impenetrable his border wall is.
DONALD TRUMP: This is a very serious wall. This is the exact-- everything they wanted. I said
give me the specifications for the wall. They said, “Well, sir, we’d like steel, but would also like
concrete and would also like rebar.” I said, “Well, what do you want? Which one?” So I did all
three. Because it’s a different form of cutting. You can cut through steel but you can’t through
the concrete, and then you can’t through the hardened rebar. We got it all. And, “We also need
see-through, sir. Got to see who’s on the other side.” That makes sense, right?
COOPER: (mimics Trump): “Yeah, that makes sense. You got to have a see-through wall
because if the wall is not see-through, the only way to know what’s on the other side is by
yelling, ‘Marco’ and hope they yell, ‘Polo!’ That’s the only way. But some Mexicans aren’t
named Marco. A lot of people don’t know that, folks. A lot of people don’t know that.” (normal
voice): But, yes, on Friday night, Trump gave his usual unhumble brag about how nothing can
get through his wall. And you know how, in a sitcom, when they cut right to the next scene? Uh,
well, cut right to the next scene.
TV REPORTER: According to The Washington Post, Mexican smuggling gangs have repeatedly
sawed through sections of Trump’s new border wall. Smugglers are using a cordless tool known
as a reciprocating saw that pretty much sells at hardware stores for as little as $100, and when
you fit it with specialized blades, the tool can pretty much slice through steel and concrete
barriers within minutes.
COOPER: Yep, that’s right. Just after Trump bragged about his super wall, we learned that
smugglers have been cutting through the new border wall with basic tools that you can buy at
any hardware store. And I honestly wouldn’t be shocked if the guys at Home Depot showed the
smugglers how to do it, because...‘cause those guys will help you with any project. Yeah, they
don't judge. They’ll just be like, "Hey, buddy, you need help with anything?" You’re like, “Yeah,
uh, I want to open a safe that's not in my house.” It's like, “Okay, you’ll need a power drill. Aisle
seven. Wait, wait, wait, wait. Is this a bank safe?” “Uh, yeah.” “Oh, then you need a blowtorch.
Aisle five. Aisle five. Also zip ties for the guards. Aisle two. My man.” Now, you might think
that Trump would be humiliated by the news that smugglers are cutting through his uncuttable
border wall, but clearly, you don’t know Trump. When asked if he was concerned that people
were able to cut through the border wall he has been touting for so long, this was the president’s
response.
TRUMP: I haven’t heard that. We have a very powerful wall. But no matter how powerful, uh,
you can cut through anything, in all fairness. You know, cutting... cutting is one thing, but it’s
easily fixed. One of the reasons we did it the way we did it, it’s very easily fixed to put the chunk
back in. But we have a very powerful wall. But you can cut through any wall.
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COOPER: Okay, hold on. Hold on. Hold on. For four years, this guy told us the wall would be
impenetrable. But now he’s like, “Yeah, of course. You can cut through anything. Of course.” In
a span of a few hours, Trump’s wall went from being Dwayne “The Rock” Johnson to literally
any other guy named Dwayne. That’s what just happened there. What happened? Huh? And also,
if Trump is saying he built it on purpose to be something that’s easy to open and then close, it
isn’t a wall. My man, you’ve built a door. I feel like that’s where this whole thing is headed.
Trump’s just gonna come out like, (mimicking Trump): “We put a door on the southern border.
So much easier. They can open it, but afterwards, it can also be closed. And who’s gonna close
it? Mexico! Close the door! Close the door!”
Dependent Variable
I observed and measured the study’s dependent variable—individual-level affective
polarization—in two distinct categories. I operationalized the first, favorability, through ‘feeling
thermometer’ questions about people and policies presented in messaging. Each thermometer
asked participants to rate their feelings towards three distinct subjects on a one-to-100 scale. I
operationalized the second subcategory, social distance, through questions designed to measure
participant attitudes in partisan-related social situations. I considered these two distinct aspects of
affective polarization collectively, as per existing research methodology. These questions are as
follows:
Table 3.5—Affective Polarization Measurement
Favorability

2. How do you feel about President Trump? 1-100 feeling thermometer
scale.
3. How do you feel about President Trump’s border wall construction? 1100 feeling thermometer scale.
4. How do you feel about Trevor Noah? 1-100 feeling thermometer scale.

Social Distance

5. How high a threat do you think your opposing political party poses to
our country? Extremely low/moderately low/nonexistent or
unsure/moderately high/extremely high.
6. How comfortable would you be with your child or a close family
member marrying someone from your opposing political party?
Extremely uncomfortable/moderately uncomfortable/neither
uncomfortable nor comfortable/moderately comfortable/extremely
comfortable.
7. How often do you consider the partisanship of potential connections
when establishing friendships or relationships?
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Never/infrequently/unsure/frequently/always.
8. How confident are you in your opposing political party’s ability to lead
our country? Extremely unconfident/moderately unconfident/neutral/
moderately confident/extremely confident.
9. How likely are you to discuss this issue with a member of your
opposing political party? Extremely unlikely/somewhat unlikely/neither
unlikely nor likely/somewhat likely/extremely likely.
Content Control and Demographics
To ensure those completing my experimental survey gave attention to their assigned
treatment, I included an easy control question about the message theme. Those incorrect answers
were segregated, and responses for these surveys were not aggregated into my larger data set.
My experimental design included a brief series of demographic questions. These
questions emphasized and reinforced the value of random assignment; this section of the survey
confirmed the validity of my response set. Random assignment ensured that members of each
treatment group were the same, confirming realistically representative samples. I modelled these
questions on existing research measures—specifically LaMarre et al.’s work—and asked
participants about distinct identities. I chose to eliminate certain items I deemed irrelevant to my
own research, as my experimental model did not account for intervening or antecedent variables.
The included control questions were as follows below.
Table 3.6—Content & Demographics Measurement
Content

Demographics

1. Which of the following best describes the issue addressed in this news
messaging? Obamacare is failing; smugglers are breaking through
President Trump’s border wall; impeachment hearings are delayed;
economic downturn is killing small businesses.
10. How old are you, in years? Fill in the blank.
11. How often do you watch The Daily Show or other satirical news
programs? Frequently/often/sometimes/rarely/never.
12. Choose the option that best describes your political affiliation. Strong
Democrat/leans Democrat/independent or unaffiliated/leans
Republican/strong Republican.
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Procedure
Rather than rely on College of Wooster students to complete my experimental research
design, I used Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) platform. MTurk is billed as a “marketplace
for work that requires human intelligence” and allows users to complete brief tasks for minute
compensation—in this case, completing a short survey. MTurk is one of the best platforms for
quickly gathering large and diverse samples, and is incredibly cost-effective. The website
additionally allows researchers to overcome many of the concerns about the usual undergraduate
demographic—often characterized as Western, educated, affluent, and liberal—by controlling
conditional characteristics. MTurk also has its flaws, of course. Participants are not always
attentive; the financial incentive to complete as many tasks as possible means many neglect
careful consideration of questions. Users also skew young, further affecting random sampling.
Still, these disadvantages are easily addressed with content manipulation checks and conditional
participant qualifications.
Participants were linked to the accordant Qualtrics survey and subsequently shown a
consent form informing them both of their rights and the benefits of completing said survey.
Further, respondents were informed that only American citizens over the age of 18 would be
permitted to take the survey. If participants gave their consent to these conditions, they were
directed to the questionnaire.
Participants were then immediately asked either to view or read their randomly assigned
treatment. The goal was to simulate a traditional viewing experience without priming
participants to consider content in a specific way. Following this content consumption,
participants were asked to complete an evaluation designed to measure their affective
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polarization. The survey ended with sequential demographic questions and a debrief elaborating
the purpose of the study. MTurk users were compensated $0.25 upon completion of the survey.
Analysis
I conducted several statistical analyses—including comparison of means, chi-squared
tests, bivariate regressions, and multivariate regressions—to assess my data. I originally expected
a positive, statistically significant relationship between exposure to TDS (my independent
variable) and audience members’ individual-level affective polarization (my dependent variable).
These completed analyses allowed me to concretely test this hypothesis, as discussed further in
the following chapter.
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS & ANALYSIS
This section is the apex of this study; the following pages clearly and concisely answer
my research question and begin to resolve my project. In the following chapter, I first
descriptively summarize the response to my experimental survey. I then outline my statistical
methodology, explicitly describing my work in Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS),
before briefly summarizing analysis output.
Sample Descriptive Statistics
Once published on Amazon’s MTurk marketplace, my survey garnered 707 total
responses. Each participant received $0.25 upon survey completion. Of the initial recorded
responses, 200 were incomplete. I eliminated these, narrowing my valid sample size to 507. I
then excluded 43 responses from noncitizens and five responses from underage (younger than 18
years old) MTurk users. I also removed responses from the 101 participants who incorrectly
answered my manipulation check question asking about the basic content of their treatment—
indicating that their answers were unreliable—as well as the 85 respondents who self-reported
Independent or neutral partisanship, reflecting their ultimately extraneous relevance to any study
concerning two-party partisan polarization. Ultimately, I winnowed my data to 273 complete,
usable responses (n=273).
In all, 142 participants watched the late-night comedy treatment clip critiquing Trump’s
border wall construction; 131 read the transcript attributed to Anderson Cooper. Approximately
190 respondents identified themselves as Democrats, while just 83 identified as Republican.
Respondents recorded an average age (as a calculated mean) of 35.77 years, with 12.21 standard
deviation. Participants reported watching late-night political comedy television at a 2.84 mean—
meaning the average respondent consumed that content just a little less infrequently than
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‘sometimes’—with 1.14 standard deviation. These descriptive statistics correspond incredibly
closely to the broader demographics of Amazon MTurk users, which skew younger, liberal, and
more likely to regularly consume news media (“Mechanical Turkers”).
Independent Variables
Each treatment group reported approximately the same descriptive independent variable
measurements. Simple comparison of means indicated virtually identical participant
demographics—the average respondent assigned the treatment video was 35.73 years old (with
11.72 standard deviation); the average respondent assigned the written transcript was 35.82 years
old (with 12.77 standard deviation). The mean media consumption among those who watched
the TDS clip was 2.87 (with 1.13 standard deviation); it was 2.8 (with 1.15 standard deviation)
among those who read the transcript. Further statistical analysis confirmed similarities between
each treatment group’s partisan composition as well (with a 2.356 chi-square value).
In other words, participants in both groups were decidedly young, reported that they
sometimes watched late-night comedy television in their daily routines, and were split equally by
partisanship. This close interrelatedness allowed both better comparison and opportunity for
individual variable isolation.
Dependent Variables
Earlier in my study, I segmented affective polarization into two distinct elements:
favorability and social distance. I chose to do so to match existing surveys and studies in the
field. Surprisingly, however, these components did not appear to be the most reliable
measurements of affective polarization; these shortcomings and limitations are discussed further
in the next chapter.
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Those who viewed the treatment video reported a mean favorability rating of 49.36 (with
3.5915 standard deviation), and a mean social distance rating of 3.59 (with 0.89 standard
deviation). Those who read the transcript reported a mean favorability score of 43.13 (with 24.37
standard deviation) and a mean social distance rating of 3.45 (with 0.85 standard deviation).
These raw statistics mean relatively little in and of themselves, but speak to subsequent statistical
analysis output confirmed by simple difference of means tests (p=0.030 for favorability, showing
statistical significance, and p=0.173 for social distance, indicating a lack of statistical
significance).
Bivariate Regressions
Once I confirmed that our two treatment groups matched descriptively—as established in
the prior discussion of independent variables—I then ran individual analyses to directly test the
effect of exposure to each treatment on favorability and social distance, respectively.
Given a common alpha value (p=0.05) to test for significance, I first conducted a
bivariate regression to check for any relationship between treatment exposure and favorability
score. This favorability measurement, one of my two dependent sub-variables, documented the
relationship between treatment exposure and audience members’ attitudes toward the political
content of each treatment (as used by Iyengar et al. 2012; Higgie 2017; Skoroda 2018). I found a
p-value of 0.030, indicating enough significance to reject our null hypothesis. These results are
graphed below in Table 4.1. Essentially, most individuals who consume late-night comedy
television programming subsequently feel more positive about the directly presented policies and
individuals post-exposure—a genuinely surprising cross-partisan finding further explained by
later multivariate analyses (it is decidedly nonplussing to suggest that liberal audience members
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would, after watching Trevor Noah eviscerate conservative policy, then be more supportive of
said policy).
Table 4.1—Treatment & Favorability Scale
unstandardized coefficients
(constant)
treatment

B
43.132
6.232

standardized
coefficient
beta
—
0.132

std. error
2.058
2.853

t
20.960
2.184

p-value
0.000
0.030

I then ran another bivariate regression to analyze the relationship between treatment
exposure and social distance. I received a p-value of 0.173—higher than the alpha value—
indicating a lack of significance. This model is charted in Table 4.2. Consequently, we can
conclude that exposure to TDS does not influence audience members’ feelings toward general
members of their opposing political party—although the B coefficient or slope is still positive, as
anticipated, indicating some insignificant relationship between consuming TDS and exacerbated
social distance rating.
Table 4.2—Treatment & Social Distance Scale
unstandardized coefficients
(constant)
treatment

B
3.447
0.144

standardized
coefficient
beta
—
0.083

std. error
0.076
0.105

t
45.311
1.367

p-value
0.000
0.173

Multivariate Regression Models
Though I had already established some significance between treatment exposure and
affective polarization, I additionally ran two multivariate regressions to test the comparative
effects of each independent variable—age, partisanship, and average late-night comedy
consumption—on my two dependent sub-variables. These further analyses allowed me to
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understand better both the unique, individual importance of each variable and their play on each
other. These model tabulations are presented in Tables 4.3 and 4.4, respectively.
Table 4.3—Multivariate (Favorability Scale)
unstandardized coefficients
(constant)
treatment
partisanship
age
media use

B
-0.424
3.368
27.163
-0.353
7.849

standardized
coefficient
beta
—
0.071
0.528
-0.182
0.376

std. error
6.150
2.309
2.587
0.096
1.046

t
-0.069
1.459
10.498
-3.693
7.502

p-value
0.945
0.146
0.000
0.000
0.000

I found no statistical significance between my treatment and any favorability scaling
(p=0.146). I did, however, find significance between each of the independent variables and
consequent individual-level affective polarization. This makes sense, considering the limitations
of my study: it will come as no surprise to anyone that life-long partisanship identity, age, or
repeated late-night comedy television consumption influenced participant behavior much more
than exposure to a single three-minute video. Still, there are consequential findings from this
endeavor—first, the older we are, the less favorable we feel about those policies or figures
critiqued in late-night comedy television programming (indicated by a negative B coefficient).
Second, a relatively high 7.849 B coefficient indicates that the more often individuals watch latenight comedy, the more broadly favorable their attitudes are toward presented content—but that
Republican viewers are much more likely to report higher favorability ratings of policies and
political figures presented in TDS than their Democratic counterparts (indicated by a positive
27.163).
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Table 4.4—Multivariate (Social Distance Scale)
unstandardized coefficients
(constant)
treatment
partisanship
age
media use

B
2.745
0.088
0.456
-0.15
0.243

standardized
coefficient
beta
—
0.051
0.241
-0.217
0.317

std. error
0.258
0.097
0.108
0.004
0.044

t
10.649
0.910
4.208
-3.865
5.551

p-value
0.000
0.364
0.000
0.000
0.000

I also failed to find any significant relationship between my treatment and audiences’
individual-level social distance rating (p=0.364). Still, however, each independent variable did
significantly influence social distance ratings. Most favorability scale findings hold true here as
well—except for one; my study indicates that the older individuals are, the lower their social
distance rating. The negative B coefficient here suggests that younger individuals are mildly less
comfortable interacting with members of opposing political parties than their elders, a
fascinating finding despite its irrelevance to the immediate matter at hand. It is unclear why this
is, although I would probably attribute it to a socio-technological generational divide.
Summarization of Results
It is evident from these statistical analyses that exposure to late-night comedy television
programming does moderately affect audience members’ individual-level affective political
polarization. It is also clear, however, that watching TDS bolsters only audience members
favorable perception of explicitly presented content, and that this relationship is markedly
stronger among Republican viewers—there are few to no consequences for audience members’
relationships with members of their opposing political party. Moreover, any effects of exposure
to TDS or similar programming are intensely mitigated by other identifying independent
variables—age, partisan identity, and average late-night comedy television consumption.
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION
In this study, I intended to uncover and understand the relationship between exposure to
late-night political comedy television programming, like TDS, and audience members’
individual-level affective polarization. I consulted literature from both political science and
political communication scholars to inform one key hypothesis: that there is a positive, direct,
linear relationship between consumption of TDS and viewers’ affective polarization. I then tested
this hypothesis using an experimental research design (specifically a Qualtrics survey published
on Amazon’s MTurk marketplace). Participants in the survey were shown either a TDS clip or a
manipulated transcript and consequently asked a series of questions intended to measure
favorability and social distance (two components of affective polarization).
This chapter is intended both to summarize the entire study, recapping my structural
research processes, and to consider further the pragmatic consequences of my findings. I first
highlight notably major conclusions, after which I consider the pragmatic implications of the
study. I then discuss the challenges and limitations of my work, as well as opportunity for future
research, before providing some final thoughts about the project.
Major Conclusions
Initial bivariate regressions indicated a mildly significant relationship between exposure
to TDS and audiences’ individual-level affective polarization. This relationship only holds for the
favorability subcomponent of affective polarization, however, as there is no indication that such
programming influences audiences’ social distance rating. Essentially, this means that late-night
comedy television only impacts viewers’ perceptions of the political policies or figures directly
presented and discussed in the show; TDS and similar programs do not impact audience
members’ personal perceptions of their opposing political party counterparts. This dichotomous
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observed relationship is almost certainly facilitated by the time-sensitive nature of the study, a
notable methodological design flaw discussed further in a later section.
The dual multivariate regressions run further explicated the strength of this relationship.
Considered alongside other powerful independent variables (age, regular media consumption,
and partisan identity), treatment assignment did not matter—but everything else did. That is,
these other traits were predictive of individual-level affective polarization. The older participants
were, for instance, the less favorable they were about anything presented in their assigned
treatment. Surprisingly, both consistent consumption of late-night comedy television and
Republican partisanship bolstered feelings of favorability—even when media content critiqued
their representatives and policy, Republican viewers reported much higher favorability ratings
than their Democratic counterparts.
These favorability findings correspond almost identically to those from the social
distance multivariate model, with one exception—age. Here, data suggests that the older you are,
the lower your social distance rating. Or, in other words, younger individuals are moderately less
comfortable interacting with members of their opposing political parties than their elders.
Implications
Political polarization is one of, if not the, most pressing threats to our contemporary
American democracy. This fragmentation freezes governmental efficiency, holds our national
economy hostage, and degrades public faith in key institutional powers. Moreover, it hurts us on
a personal level, steamrolling through friendships, family ties, and potential romances.
It is only once we understand the origin of this polarization, however, that we can begin to
address it or protect ourselves from any potential influence. This study arose of this necessity and
an informed guess about the power of late-night political comedy television programming. My
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conjecture, as it turns out, was roughly correct—consuming late-night political comedy
television does affect audiences’ perceptions of political figures and issues in a way traditional
news media do not, even if that influence does not extend to audiences’ perception of their
opposing political party counterparts. TDS, among similar television programming, is actively
shaping our internal political conceptualizations.
I opened this study with the explicit conjecture that consuming late-night comedy
television programming observably exacerbates viewers’ individual-level affective political
polarization. Consequent statistical analyses proved this hypothesis only partially correct—I
found significance for just one aspect of affective polarization—but should be treated cautiously,
both because certain findings remain fascinatingly inexplicable (cross-partisan favorability
significance, for instance) and because of the limitations of the employed single-exposure
treatment method.
“Laughing Matters” exists as a basis for future research. Further consideration of the
issue could simply extend this work, focusing on narrower influence (highlighting just
favorability effects, for instance) or reworking the experiment with repeated treatment exposure,
but could also deviate significantly. I chose to ground my work in late-night comedy television
out of personal interest and casually observed behavior, but similar studies could—and probably
should—be conducted on the effects of talk radio, podcasts, or any other media.
Limitations
This research project provides an initial template, as previously mentioned, for any future
research concerning audiences’ individual-level reaction to satirical television programming.
Researchers interested in this issue, however, should spend time constructing more reliable
measurement; running Cronbach’s Alpha tests for each affective polarization subscale revealed
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flawed question groupings. Essentially, certain questions (i.e., “How comfortable would you be
with your child or a close family member marrying someone from your opposing political
party?”) used in this study do not all measure their intended effect well, and further reflection
and editing would be beneficial. For instance, replacing questions grounded in individual social
scenarios with questions about partisan perception—asking about emotional state rather than
hypothetical behavior—might yield better results.
Moreover, the partisan nature of my treatment content posed an interesting challenge.
Ideally, I would have included both liberally-biased and a conservatively-biased late-night
comedy television content. Unfortunately, it was incredibly difficult to find any substantive
contemporary television program presenting conservative political comedy, which necessitated a
decidedly more partisan methodological structure.
In addition to flawed measurement construction and partisan treatment challenges,
formatting and medium became evidently problematic throughout this study. Though the
‘control’ transcript attributed to Anderson Cooper matched the TDS clip verbatim, there is still
undeniably a pronounced difference between watching a performance and just reading the
particular words used. Tone, body language, and other presentational elements are all vital to
messaging interpretation.
I would also like to address one other intensely significant shortcoming of the project:
time frame. Ideally, this study would have measured the effects of prolonged or repeated
exposure to TDS content over a longer period. This is a complicated observation to make in a
real-world setting, however, because of the abundance of other potential intervening or
moderating variables that complicate causation. Furthermore, the academic time constraints
placed upon the project made any prolonged or repeated treatment virtually impossible.
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Ultimately, it is highly likely that a one-time exposure treatment is not enough to observe any
significant relationship or effect. This shortcoming is especially pertinent to the social distance
aspect of affective polarization, as repeated exposure to TDS or similar programming is virtually
guaranteed to shape personal social behavior more than exposure to a single video.
Final Thoughts
This project and its statistical analyses paint a picture of a country divided by much more
than media consumption, though exposure to certain programming does matter. These findings
point to the importance of personal identity in affective polarization—including both partisan
identity and age—and consequently suggest that our political thought and behavior are dictated
by those traits we use to define ourselves. This confirms the value of social identity theory—
referenced much earlier in my literature review—and means any effort we make to resolve
polarization must begin with collective reflection of our own deep-rooted principles and
ideologies (Huddy et al. 2015; Shields 2005; Suhay 2015).
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APPENDIX
Table 3.1—Consent Form
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH STUDY THE COLLEGE OF WOOSTER
Political Media Consumption
Principal Investigator: Nicholas Shereikis
Purpose
You are being asked to participate in an independent research study. This survey is intended to
gather information regarding late-night political comedy television exposure and political
polarization.
Procedures
If you decide to participate, you will be asked to consume a brief piece of political media content
before answering a series of questions. The survey should take no longer than 10 minutes to
complete.
Risks
There are no direct or indirect risks associated with participation in this survey.
Benefits
Following completion of the survey, you will be credited $0.25 to your MTurk account.
Confidentiality
Any information you give will be held confidential. All data will be stored on a password
protected Microsoft Word file, and reported in aggregate form only. This file will be deleted
once all data is collected.
Costs
There is no cost to you beyond the time and effort required to complete the survey described
above.
Right to Refuse or Withdraw
You may refuse to participate in the survey. If you decide to participate, you may change your
mind about being in the study and withdraw at any point during the process.
Questions
If you have any questions, you can contact me by email at nshereikis20@wooster.edu. You may
also contact my advisor, Dr. Angie Bos, at abos@wooster.edu.
Consent
By continuing, you are indicating that you have decided to participate in this survey, that you
have read and understood the above information, and that you are at least 18 years of age.
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Table 3.2—TDS Treatment Transcript
TREVOR NOAH: But it seemed like this was a wall-themed weekend for Donald Trump,
because on Friday, at a rally in Mississippi, the president was boasting once again about just how
impenetrable his border wall is.
DONALD TRUMP: This is a very serious wall. This is the exact-- everything they wanted. I said
give me the specifications for the wall. They said, “Well, sir, we’d like steel, but would also like
concrete and would also like rebar.” I said, “Well, what do you want? Which one?” So I did all
three. Because it’s a different form of cutting. You can cut through steel but you can’t through
the concrete, and then you can’t through the hardened rebar. We got it all. And, “We also need
see-through, sir. Got to see who’s on the other side.” That makes sense, right?
NOAH: (mimics Trump): “Yeah, that makes sense. You got to have a see-through wall because if
the wall is not see-through, the only way to know what’s on the other side is by yelling, ‘Marco’
and hope they yell, ‘Polo!’ That’s the only way. But some Mexicans aren’t named Marco. A lot
of people don’t know that, folks. A lot of people don’t know that.” (normal voice): But, yes, on
Friday night, Trump gave his usual unhumble brag about how nothing can get through his wall.
And you know how, in a sitcom, when they cut right to the next scene? Uh, well, cut right to the
next scene.
TV REPORTER: According to The Washington Post, Mexican smuggling gangs have repeatedly
sawed through sections of Trump’s new border wall. Smugglers are using a cordless tool known
as a reciprocating saw that pretty much sells at hardware stores for as little as $100, and when
you fit it with specialized blades, the tool can pretty much slice through steel and concrete
barriers within minutes.
NOAH: Yep, that’s right. Just after Trump bragged about his super wall, we learned that
smugglers have been cutting through the new border wall with basic tools that you can buy at
any hardware store. And I honestly wouldn’t be shocked if the guys at Home Depot showed the
smugglers how to do it, because...‘cause those guys will help you with any project. Yeah, they
don't judge. They’ll just be like, "Hey, buddy, you need help with anything?" You’re like, “Yeah,
uh, I want to open a safe that's not in my house.” It's like, “Okay, you’ll need a power drill. Aisle
seven. Wait, wait, wait, wait. Is this a bank safe?” “Uh, yeah.” “Oh, then you need a blowtorch.
Aisle five. Aisle five. Also zip ties for the guards. Aisle two. My man.” Now, you might think
that Trump would be humiliated by the news that smugglers are cutting through his uncuttable
border wall, but clearly, you don’t know Trump. When asked if he was concerned that people
were able to cut through the border wall he has been touting for so long, this was the president’s
response.
TRUMP: I haven’t heard that. We have a very powerful wall. But no matter how powerful, uh,
you can cut through anything, in all fairness. You know, cutting... cutting is one thing, but it’s
easily fixed. One of the reasons we did it the way we did it, it’s very easily fixed to put the chunk
back in. But we have a very powerful wall. But you can cut through any wall.
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NOAH: Okay, hold on. Hold on. Hold on. For four years, this guy told us the wall would be
impenetrable. But now he’s like, “Yeah, of course. You can cut through anything. Of course.” In
a span of a few hours, Trump’s wall went from being Dwayne “The Rock” Johnson to literally
any other guy named Dwayne. That’s what just happened there. What happened? Huh? And also,
if Trump is saying he built it on purpose to be something that’s easy to open and then close, it
isn’t a wall. My man, you’ve built a door. I feel like that’s where this whole thing is headed.
Trump’s just gonna come out like, (mimicking Trump): “We put a door on the southern border.
So much easier. They can open it, but afterwards, it can also be closed. And who’s gonna close
it? Mexico! Close the door! Close the door!”
Table 3.3—TDS Treatment Images

Table 3.4—Narrative (attributed to CNN’s Anderson Cooper)
ANDERSON COOPER: But it seemed like this was a wall-themed weekend for Donald Trump,
because on Friday, at a rally in Mississippi, the president was boasting once again about just how
impenetrable his border wall is.
DONALD TRUMP: This is a very serious wall. This is the exact-- everything they wanted. I said
give me the specifications for the wall. They said, “Well, sir, we’d like steel, but would also like
concrete and would also like rebar.” I said, “Well, what do you want? Which one?” So I did all
three. Because it’s a different form of cutting. You can cut through steel but you can’t through
the concrete, and then you can’t through the hardened rebar. We got it all. And, “We also need
see-through, sir. Got to see who’s on the other side.” That makes sense, right?
COOPER: (mimics Trump): “Yeah, that makes sense. You got to have a see-through wall
because if the wall is not see-through, the only way to know what’s on the other side is by
yelling, ‘Marco’ and hope they yell, ‘Polo!’ That’s the only way. But some Mexicans aren’t
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named Marco. A lot of people don’t know that, folks. A lot of people don’t know that.” (normal
voice): But, yes, on Friday night, Trump gave his usual unhumble brag about how nothing can
get through his wall. And you know how, in a sitcom, when they cut right to the next scene? Uh,
well, cut right to the next scene.
TV REPORTER: According to The Washington Post, Mexican smuggling gangs have repeatedly
sawed through sections of Trump’s new border wall. Smugglers are using a cordless tool known
as a reciprocating saw that pretty much sells at hardware stores for as little as $100, and when
you fit it with specialized blades, the tool can pretty much slice through steel and concrete
barriers within minutes.
COOPER: Yep, that’s right. Just after Trump bragged about his super wall, we learned that
smugglers have been cutting through the new border wall with basic tools that you can buy at
any hardware store. And I honestly wouldn’t be shocked if the guys at Home Depot showed the
smugglers how to do it, because...‘cause those guys will help you with any project. Yeah, they
don't judge. They’ll just be like, "Hey, buddy, you need help with anything?" You’re like, “Yeah,
uh, I want to open a safe that's not in my house.” It's like, “Okay, you’ll need a power drill. Aisle
seven. Wait, wait, wait, wait. Is this a bank safe?” “Uh, yeah.” “Oh, then you need a blowtorch.
Aisle five. Aisle five. Also zip ties for the guards. Aisle two. My man.” Now, you might think
that Trump would be humiliated by the news that smugglers are cutting through his uncuttable
border wall, but clearly, you don’t know Trump. When asked if he was concerned that people
were able to cut through the border wall he has been touting for so long, this was the president’s
response.
TRUMP: I haven’t heard that. We have a very powerful wall. But no matter how powerful, uh,
you can cut through anything, in all fairness. You know, cutting... cutting is one thing, but it’s
easily fixed. One of the reasons we did it the way we did it, it’s very easily fixed to put the chunk
back in. But we have a very powerful wall. But you can cut through any wall.
COOPER: Okay, hold on. Hold on. Hold on. For four years, this guy told us the wall would be
impenetrable. But now he’s like, “Yeah, of course. You can cut through anything. Of course.” In
a span of a few hours, Trump’s wall went from being Dwayne “The Rock” Johnson to literally
any other guy named Dwayne. That’s what just happened there. What happened? Huh? And also,
if Trump is saying he built it on purpose to be something that’s easy to open and then close, it
isn’t a wall. My man, you’ve built a door. I feel like that’s where this whole thing is headed.
Trump’s just gonna come out like, (mimicking Trump): “We put a door on the southern border.
So much easier. They can open it, but afterwards, it can also be closed. And who’s gonna close
it? Mexico! Close the door! Close the door!”
Table 3.5—Affective Polarization Measurement
Favorability

2. How do you feel about President Trump? 1-100 feeling thermometer
scale.
3. How do you feel about President Trump’s border wall construction? 1100 feeling thermometer scale.
4. How do you feel about Trevor Noah? 1-100 feeling thermometer scale.
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Social Distance

5. How high a threat do you think your opposing political party poses to
our country? Extremely low/moderately low/nonexistent or
unsure/moderately high/extremely high.
6. How comfortable would you be with your child or a close family
member marrying someone from your opposing political party?
Extremely uncomfortable/moderately uncomfortable/neither
uncomfortable nor comfortable/moderately comfortable/extremely
comfortable.
7. How often do you consider the partisanship of potential connections
when establishing friendships or relationships?
Never/infrequently/unsure/frequently/always.
8. How confident are you in your opposing political party’s ability to lead
our country? Extremely unconfident/moderately unconfident/neutral/
moderately confident/extremely confident.
9. How likely are you to discuss this issue with a member of your
opposing political party? Extremely unlikely/somewhat unlikely/neither
unlikely nor likely/somewhat likely/extremely likely.
Table 3.6—Content & Demographics Measurement

Content

Demographics

1. Which of the following best describes the issue addressed in this news
messaging? Obamacare is failing; smugglers are breaking through
President Trump’s border wall; impeachment hearings are delayed;
economic downturn is killing small businesses.
10. How old are you, in years? Fill in the blank.
11. How often do you watch The Daily Show or other satirical news
programs? Frequently/often/sometimes/rarely/never.
12. Choose the option that best describes your political affiliation. Strong
Democrat/leans Democrat/independent or unaffiliated/leans
Republican/strong Republican.
Table 3.7—Debrief Text

Thank you again for your participation in this study. The purpose of this investigation is to
determine if and how exposure to late-night political comedy television programming alters
viewer perception of political polarization. To accurately reflect the late-night political comedy
television landscape, treatment included only The Daily Show segments containing liberal bias
as well as a control message, or written delivery of the same information falsely attributed to
CNN’s Anderson Cooper. You were randomly shown one piece of mediated content, and
consequently asked questions designed to measure your emotional state and sense of political
polarization. I anticipate that participants shown late-night comedy television programming will
report higher feels of anger and hostility, as well as political polarization, than those exposed to
written content attributed to mainstream press. Thank you again for your participation. If you
have any questions or concerns about this study, please feel free to contact either me at
nshereikis20@wooster.edu or my advisor, Dr. Angie Bos, at abos@wooster.edu.
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Table 4.1—Treatment & Favorability Scale
unstandardized coefficients
(constant)
treatment

B
43.132
6.232

standardized
coefficient
beta
—
0.132

std. error
2.058
2.853

t
20.960
2.184

p-value
0.000
0.030

Table 4.2—Treatment & Social Distance Scale
unstandardized coefficients
(constant)
treatment

B
3.447
0.144

standardized
coefficient
beta
—
0.083

std. error
0.076
0.105

t
45.311
1.367

p-value
0.000
0.173

Table 4.3—Multivariate (Favorability Scale)
unstandardized coefficients
(constant)
treatment
partisanship
age
media use

B
-0.424
3.368
27.163
-0.353
7.849

standardized
coefficient
beta
—
0.071
0.528
-0.182
0.376

std. error
6.150
2.309
2.587
0.096
1.046

t
-0.069
1.459
10.498
-3.693
7.502

p-value
0.945
0.146
0.000
0.000
0.000

Table 4.4—Multivariate (Social Distance Scale)
unstandardized coefficients
(constant)
treatment
partisanship
age
media use

B
2.745
0.088
0.456
-0.15
0.243

standardized
coefficient
beta
—
0.051
0.241
-0.217
0.317

std. error
0.258
0.097
0.108
0.004
0.044
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t
10.649
0.910
4.208
-3.865
5.551

p-value
0.000
0.364
0.000
0.000
0.000

